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Using a two−country model of monopolistic competition with cross−country technical
heterogeneity, this note explores the determinants of comparative advantage. It is shown that
trade patterns are determined by a technology index, and that autarky relative prices do not
serve as reliable predictors of trade patterns.
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Ever since the seminal work of Krugman (1979), Chamberlinian monopolistic
competition models of trade have been proliferated. One of the major phe-
nomena evident from these models is the emergence of intra-industry trade
(i.e., two-way trade of diﬀerentiated products). The standard monopolistic
competition models are based on the assumption of cross-country technical
homogeneity: each ﬁrm in the monopolistically competitive sector incurs an
identical ﬁxed cost (α) and a constant marginal cost (β). To emphasize the
role of increasing returns and imperfect competition, the Ricardian aspect
(cross-country technical heterogeneity) is downplayed in the standard mod-
els. This treatment is justiﬁed as a modeling strategy. On the other hand,
there has been little investigation of the role of technical heterogeneity among
countries.1
The main purpose of this note is to explore cross-country technical het-
erogeneity as a determinant of trade patterns. The analysis is carried out
within a two-country framework. The countries are identical in every respect
except for the technology of the monopolistically competitive sector. Both
ﬁxed costs and marginal costs can diﬀer between the countries. It will be
shown that, with cross-country technical heterogeneity in the monopolisti-
cally competitive sector, intra-industry trade is very unlikely in a trading
equilibrium. It will also be shown that trade patterns are determined by a
technology index and that the autarky prices do not reﬂect the structure of
comparative advantage.
The next section develops a one-factor Chamberlinian-Ricardian model.
Section 3 deals with the determinants of trade patterns. Section 4 discusses
some directions in which the model could be extended.
2 The model
Suppose there are two countries in the world, Home and Foreign, and that
they are similar in regard to consumers’ preferences and size but not neces-
sarily in regard to production technologies. There is only one primary factor
of production: labor. There are two sectors: the competitive sector which
produces a homogeneous good, and the monopolistically competitive sector
1 Venables (1987) explores the inﬂuence of technological diﬀerences in the monopolis-
tically competitive sector on trade patterns.However, his results are dependent on both
the existence of transport costs and asymmetric preferences.
1which produces a large variety of diﬀerentiated products. The homogeneous
good, which will be taken as the numeraire, is produced under constant re-
turns to scale technology.
Demands are derived from the utility function of a single representa-
tive consumer in each country. Each consumer maximizes the quasi-utility
function2
U =  
−1D
  + Y, 0 < <1, (1)
where Y is the consumption level of the homogeneous good and D is the
quantity index of the diﬀerentiated products. The quantity index takes the
well-known form
D =









, 0 <θ<1, (2)
where n (n∗) is the number of products produced in Home (Foreign), di (di∗)
is the quantity of product i (i∗), and 1/(1 − θ) > 1 is the elasticity of
substitution between every pair of products. The aggregate price index for
the diﬀerentiated product can be obtained as:
P =










where pi (pi∗) is the price of the i (i∗)-th diﬀerentiated product produced in
Home (Foreign).
The consumer’s utility maximization problem can be solved in two steps.3
Let us take the case of Home. First, whatever the value of the quantity index,
D, each di (di∗) needs to be chosen so as to minimize the cost of attaining
D. By solving the cost minimization problem, we obtain
di =( pi/P)
1/(θ−1)D, i =1 ,...,n,
di∗ =( pi∗/P)
1/(θ−1)D, i∗ =1 ,...,n
∗.
The upper-level step of the consumer’s problem is to divide total income




2 See Helpman and Krugman (1989, chap.7).
3 See, for example, Helpman and Krugman (1985, chap.6).

































Diﬀerentiated products are supplied by monopolistically competitive ﬁrms.
There is cross-country technical heterogeneity: each Home (Foreign) ﬁrm has
both a ﬁxed cost α (α∗) and a constant marginal cost β (β∗). With the
number of ﬁrms being very large, the elasticity of demand for each product
becomes 1/(1 − θ). Thus, each product is priced at a markup over marginal
cost:
pi = β/θ, pi∗ = β
∗/θ. (6)
It must be noted that the relative autarky prices reﬂect the relative marginal
costs: (pi/pi∗)=( β/β∗).
Before turning to the trading equilibrium, we must draw attention to the
autarky equilibrium of Home (i.e., n∗ = 0). Assuming that nA ﬁrms with








Substituting this into the demand function yields the proﬁt function for each
ﬁrm45
π =( p − β)x − α
= [(1 − θ)/θ]βx− α






It is important to note that proﬁts are increasing in the number of ﬁrms
if  >θ . In this case the diﬀerentiated products would be complements
rather than substitutes. To exclude this case, we assume  <θ . Solving the
zero-proﬁt condition (π = 0) yields
n
A =( θ/β)
θ /(θ− )[(1 − θ)/α]
[θ(1− )]/(θ− ). (9)
4 Hereafter, the subscript i is dropped for simplicity.
5 The proﬁt function is derived from the demand function (5) and the pricing rule (6).
33 Trading equilibrium
Suppose that the two countries open their goods markets. Given that both
countries continue to produce the homogeneous good, Home (Foreign) prod-
ucts are sold at price p = β/θ (p∗ = β∗/θ). In what follows, the analysis is
restricted to this case.
In the trading equilibrium, we need non-positive proﬁts in each country,
with proﬁts being equal to zero if production takes place. Thus, by set-
ting proﬁts equal to zero for both countries (π = π∗ = 0), we would like
to test whether the co-existence of both countries’ ﬁrms is consistent with
equilibrium.
Firstly, let us draw attention to a condition that, if both countries’ ﬁrms
co-exist, proﬁts must be identical for each country’s ﬁrms, i.e.,
π = π
∗. (10)
This is the condition that must be satisﬁed if π = π∗ = 0 has to hold.
Substituting the demand functions (4) and (5) and the pricing rule (6) into

























It is important to note that proﬁts are independent of both the total number
of ﬁrms and market size.
Before turning to the case of co-existence, note that the equilibrium num-




θ /(θ− )[2(1 − θ)/α]





θ /(θ− )[2(1 − θ)/α
∗]
[θ(1− )]/(θ− ), (13)
where T refers to the value in trading equilibrium.
Using these results, one can obtain the necessary condition for the co-





4In free trade equilibrium with the co-existence of ﬁrms, the proﬁt must be
zero: π = π∗ = 0. Simple calculations show that the equations are satisﬁed
only if the technology index, Φ, is equal to 1. This implies that, given techni-
cal heterogeneity in the monopolistically competitive sector, the co-existence
of both countries’ ﬁrms is very unlikely in a trading equilibrium. Now the
surprising feature of Chamberlinian-Ricardian trade patterns becomes evi-
dent.
Proposition: If Φ > (<)1, only Foreign (Home) ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated
products and Foreign (Home) becomes an exporter of diﬀerentiated products.
Intra-industry trade (i.e., the co-existence of both countries’ ﬁrms) occurs
only if Φ=1 .
[Proof] Suppose that Φ < 1. In this case, both countries’ ﬁrms cannot co-








This becomes positive if Φ < 1. Therefore, Foreign ﬁrms have an incentive to
enter the world market. Also, the case in which only Home ﬁrms are active
cannot support a free trading equilibrium. Since




is negative, Home ﬁrms have no incentive to enter given that n∗T Foreign ﬁrms
are active. Therefore, only Foreign ﬁrms produce diﬀerentiated products in
the free trade equilibrium. The case of Φ > 1 can be proven analogously.
[Q.E.D.]
Two points are worth noting here. First, in a free trade equilibrium with
cross-country technical heterogeneity, it is rare for more than one country to
specialize in the production of diﬀerentiated products. In other words, with
slight technical heterogeneity, intra-industry trade never occurs. Second,
trade patterns are determined by the technology index Φ, which is composed
of (a) relative ﬁxed costs, (b) relative marginal costs, and (c) the substitu-
tion parameter θ.6 On the other hand, autarky relative prices (which only
reﬂect the relative marginal costs) do not reﬂect true comparative advan-
tages. Hence, even if a country has a higher autarky price for diﬀerentiated
6 See (14).
5products in autarky equilibrium, the country may become an exporter of
those products. We would like to stress the failure of autarky prices to reveal
comparative advantage: the point is that prices reﬂect marginal costs, but
eﬃciency depends on both the magnitude of the marginal and the ﬁxed cost
components.
Paramount is the interaction between cross-country technical heterogene-
ity and trade patterns in the model of monopolistic competition: if an arbi-
trarily small amount of cross-country technical heterogeneity is introduced,
intra-industry trade will cease.
4 Discussion
Finally, it is important to note that the above argument depends on the
assumption that both countries continue to produce the homogeneous good
in the trading equilibrium (i. e., the case of incomplete specialization). Be-
cause of this assumption, wage rates are equalized between countries, which
makes the analysis tractable. While this assumption is justiﬁed for the case
where the diﬀerentiated products sector is small compared to the entire econ-
omy, it is also important to explore what happens if one country completely
specializes in the diﬀerentiated products.7
As space is limited, let us take the case where Φ < 1 holds and only Home
ﬁrms produce the diﬀerentiated products while only Foreign ﬁrms produce
the homogeneous good. If Home completely specializes in the diﬀerentiated
products, the equilibrium number of ﬁrms ¯ nT will be obtained by solving the
labor market condition
¯ n
T = L/[α + β(2d)], (16)
where L is the Home labor endowment. Since the demand for each diﬀer-
entiated product in one country (d) does not depend on the income level,
the total supply of each product becomes 2d.8 Since each country consumes
the equal amount of the diﬀerentiated products and only Home exports the
diﬀerentiated products, the balance-of-payments condition becomes
¯ n
T(βw/θ)d = wL − ¯ n
T(βw/θ)d, (17)
7 This case occurs when the share of the diﬀerentiated products sector is large in the
economy.In this regard, Ethier (1982) explores the inﬂuence of both the expenditure
share for the increasing returns good and the size of a country on trade patterns.
8 See (4).
6where w is the Home wage rate.9 The LHS is the Home export value of
the diﬀerentiated products, while the RHS is the Home import value of the
homogeneous good.10 In this case, wage rates diverge between countries
in order to attain balance-of-payments equilibrium. By using (4), (16) and
(17), one can obtain the equilibrium number of ﬁrms (¯ nT), the demand for
each product (d), and the Home wage rate (w). The same as the case of
incomplete specialization, this case also implies that, in the presence of tech-
nical heterogeneity, intra-industry trade hardly ever occurs. In order to fully
analyze the interaction of technical heterogeneity and intra-industry trade
patterns, this kind of extension needs further consideration.
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